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a b s t r a c t
Since its launch in 2014, Amazon Echo family of devices has seen a considerable increase in adaptation in consumer homes and oﬃces. With a market worth millions of dollars, Echo is used for diverse tasks such as accessing online information, making phone calls, purchasing items, and controlling the smart home. Echo oﬀers
user-friendly voice interaction to automate everyday tasks making it a massive success. Though many people
view Amazon Echo as a helpful assistant at home or oﬃce, few know its underlying security and privacy implications. In this paper, we present the ﬁndings of our research on Amazon Echo’s security and privacy concerns.
The ﬁndings are divided into diﬀerent categories by vulnerability or attacks. The proposed mitigation(s) to the
vulnerabilities are also presented in the paper. We conclude that though numerous privacy concerns and security
vulnerabilities associated with the device are mitigated, many vulnerabilities still need to be addressed.

1. Introduction
The widespread adoption of Amazon Echo family of devices has
made Intelligent Virtual Assistant (IVA) ubiquitous in modern homes.
More than 100 million devices have been sold by January 2019 that
have Alexa on board [1]. Similarly, the global smart speaker market
size is growing tremendously and can reach a worth of USD 15.6 billion
by 2025 [2].
The device’s popularity is partially attributed to its ability to carry
out tasks using voice commands, which promotes human-computer
interaction to a higher stage and abandons touch-based or other physical interactions-based interface. Though the new avenue of interaction
has transcended device usability, it also introduces unforeseen security
concerns. In 2017, a broadcast event triggered Amazon Echo in multiple
households while covering an incident related to Amazon Echo [3].
Malicious skills that have similar names to genuine skills can be created
to collect user information [4]. Additionally, inaudible voice commands
can be used to exploit Alexa and carry out attacks [5]. In addition,
since Intelligent Virtual Assistants (IVAs) are very intrusive to users’
personal space, proper security and privacy concerns must be assessed.
Thus, these systems become more prone to attacks without proper
research and analysis on underlying security vulnerabilities and privacy
concerns. Multiple articles in the literature summarize the security
and privacy concerns of smart homes and smart speakers [6–10].
Despite the extensive publication on smart home and speakers, very
few works deal with vulnerabilities speciﬁc to Amazon Echo [11,12].

∗

Edu et al. [9] have comprehensively studied on security, privacy,
and attacks on smart speakers. Our ﬁndings corroborate the results
of the study and expand with more evidence. We have added additional vulnerabilities speciﬁc to Amazon Echo and presented/analyzed
mitigation techniques. Studies speciﬁc to Amazon Echo [11,12] have
left out details of vulnerabilities/attacks and mitigation techniques.
We have added new vulnerabilities to this review literature. We
have also systematically presented detailed software, hardware, system vulnerabilities, and adversary attacks to provide an inclusive
review.
The major contributions of this work are:
•
•

•
•

We outline the major components of Amazon Echo ecosystem.
We studied and listed vulnerabilities of Amazon Echo classiﬁed into
software, hardware, and system vulnerability.
We discuss mitigation to those vulnerabilities.
We present the results of a few adversary attacks on Amazon Echo.

We have presented the paper in the following structure: We outline
diﬀerent components of Amazon Echo ecosystem in Section 2. After that,
we discuss the vulnerabilities of Amazon Echo categorized into software,
hardware, and system vulnerability in Section 3. Simultaneously, we
present mitigation to the vulnerability found in literature review. We
also present a few vulnerabilities exploited by attackers in this section.
Finally, we provide the conclusion of the paper along with future works
in Section 4.
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Fig. 1. Amazon Alexa Ecosystem and Corresponding Vulnerabilities [13]: ➀ Booting into Device Firmware, Dolphin Attack, Always listening Mechanism. ➁ CrossSite Scripting Vulnerability. ➂ Network Traﬃc Analysis Vulnerability, Device Pairing Protocol Vulnerability. ➃ Cloud vulnerability, Automatic Speech Recognition
Errors. ➄ Skill Squatting Attack, Voice Masquerading Attack.

2. Amazon alexa ecosystem

3.1. Software vulnerabilities

Amazon Echo has become a very popular virtual assistant in the
past few years. The services oﬀered by the device have beneﬁted many
households and even businesses. Using the Amazon Echo, users can easily carry out multiple actions by just speaking to the device, a futuristic
living experience that was thought of as ﬁction a few years ago. Though
many people may not be aware of it, there is a solid architecture to
carry out these functionalities. There are several entities playing roles
in this ecosystem. Each of the entities shown in Fig. 1 is discussed in this
section.
Alexa-enabled devices. Alexa-enabled devices are the Amazon
Echo family of devices that user interacts with, usually by speaking out
a command. The device consists primarily of a microphone and speaker
and is connected to the Internet. A wake word is used to activate the
device. After activation, it starts recording voice which is passed to the
Alexa voice service, where computation is done. When the computation
is complete, it receives a response that is played as sound.
Alexa cloud services. Most of the computation of Intelligent Voice
Assistant is carried out in Alexa cloud services. The voice commands are
sent to Amazon Echo, and the response is stored in Alexa cloud services.
Alexa cloud service composes entities that carry out Automatic Speech
Recognition, Speech-Language Understanding, Natural Language Understanding, Text-to-Speech conversion, etc.
Companion clients. Devices running one of the Alexa companion
applications, such as Amazon Alexa, are companion clients. Apart from
interacting with Alexa using voice commands, users can interact with
them through a companion app. Though there is no speciﬁc companion
application native to personal computers, users can still access Alexa
using the web browser from a personal computer.
Third-party Internet of Things (IoT) devices. Compatible IoT devices increase the usability of Amazon Echo by adding additional voicecontrolled functionalities. With a growing adaptation of Amazon Echo,
the number of compatible IoT devices is also increasing. Some of the
popular compatible IoT devices include Philips Hue, Lifx Mini, August
WiFi Smart Lock, etc.
Third-party applications. The functionality of Amazon Echo is enhanced by many third-party applications that extend Alexa’s capabilities. In addition, the “skills” extend Alexa’s functionality, enriching user
experience and enabling user-tailored services. Some examples are Lyft
(ride-sharing), Domino’s (food ordering), The Wall Street Journal (news
updates), etc.

3.1.1. Skill squatting attack
Skills are the voice-driven capabilities developed for Alexa to power
Amazon devices, such as Echo [14]. These skills that enrich Echo capabilities are developed using Alexa Skills Kit. More than 130,000 Alexa
skills have been developed by 2021 [15]. A common skill usage scenario is illustrated in Fig. 2. Though skills extend Alexa functionality,
they introduce a new attack vector.
Skill squatting attack exploits predictable errors, including homophones, compound words, and phonetic confusion, to wrongly direct
users to malicious skills. Attackers create malicious skills with a similar
invocation and intent name to legitimate skills [12]. A user intending
to access a benign skill may be routed to malicious skill due to phonetic
confusion. When a malicious skill gets access to the user device, further
attacks can be carried out from there. Skill squatting attack is comparable to domain name typo-squatting in web applications where domain
name’s common typos are exploited.
Kumar et al. [4] carried out an experiment by developing multiple
pairs of skills having similar invocation names. A total of 27 pairs of
skills (target skill and squatted skill) are developed to examine whether
Alexa triggers squatted skill instead of the requested target skill. Twentyﬁve of the total 27 pairs of skills are squatted at least once, giving a
success rate of 92.6%. Skill squatting attacks can be extended to target a
speciﬁc demographic which is termed spear skill squatting. “Squattable”
words in the language of a demographic are exploited to target and
attack the group in spear skill squatting.

3. Vulnerabilities and mitigation technologies
This section reviews and summarizes the major vulnerabilities of
Amazon Echo devices and corresponding mitigation techniques.

Fig. 2. A User-Alexa interaction to order a pizza [4].
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Table 1
Summary of Amazon echo vulnerabilities and Attacks.
Exploitation
mechanism

Vulnerability

Threat

Mitigation

Software

Skill Squatting Attack [4,12]

Malicious skill gets control of device

Voice Masquerading Attack [17]
Network Traﬃc Analysis
Vulnerability [18]
Device Pairing Protocol Vulnerability [19]

Malicious skill eavesdrops user’s communication
Adversary can detect user-device interaction time

Screening of new skill’s name using Word-based
and phenom-based techniques
Skill response checker and User intention classiﬁer
-

BlueBorne attack vector [20]
Broadcast Media Vulnerability [3]
Automatic Speech Recognition Errors [21]
Lack of Authorization Mechanism [22]
Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerability [23]
Cloud vulnerability [24,25]
Hardware

Dolphin Attack [5]

System

Booting into Device Firmware [26] [27]
Always listening Mechanism [28]

Miscellaneous

Lack of Physical Presence Detection
Mechanism [22]
REEVE Attack Vulnerability [29]
DoS Attack Vulnerability [30]

Associate a previously deregistered device to another
amazon account
Linux kernel and SDP server threats
Echo triggered by broadcasting events
Alexa misunderstands words and triggers
Any person can command Alexa
Access, install and remove user’s skills list
Large amount of data stored in single place may be
vulnerable
Inject inaudible commands using ultrasonic channel
Echo can be exploited by gaining root shell access
Alexa records and streams conversation without
utilizing wake word
Echo picks up commands from outside window/door
Use household audio device to remotely control Alexa
Makes Echo unavailable for use during attack period

Initially associating new Amazon Echo with
Amazon account used to purchase the devic
Amazon published security patches
On-the-cloud system to detect media audios
Command discarded after looking on Amazon
server
User-voice authentication mechanism
Findings shared with Amazon and issue ﬁxed
Utilizing non-linearity traces that can not be
erased during signal modulation
Issue ﬁxed in later iterations of Amazon Echo
Turing Echo mic oﬀ while not using the device
VSButton to check physical presence of user
Two-factor authentication mechanism
-

Mitigation. Skill squatting vulnerability can be mitigated by adding
a screening process during skill certiﬁcation to scrutinize whether a skill
can be confused with another registered skill. Currently, there are 30
skills with the name “Cat Facts”, however the mechanism of how amazon routes a request is unknown. Such vulnerable skills can be mitigated
by thorough scrutiny at the screening process such that each skill has a
unique name. Though this mechanism may mitigate the vulnerability,
skill publishers may have a conﬂict over skill names. They may want a
simple skill name which may lead to name scarcity.
3.1.2. Voice masquerading attack
In Voice Masquerading Attack (VMA), users are unaware of skill
eavesdropping on their conversations. As a result, an adversary can exploit the vulnerability to extract a user’s private information. There are
two major types of VMAs [17]:
•
•

Fig. 3. A skill faking termination: User shares personal information thinking
skill is terminated [16].
Table 2
Survey responses of Amazon Echo users [17].

In-communication skill switch; and
Faking termination.

In-communication skill switch is an opportunistic attack where a skill
pretends to be another skill. The attack may occur when a user tries to
switch skills during interaction with Alexa. A malicious skill pretends to
hand over execution to the target skill by impersonating the target skill.
As a result, the user may share the information intended for the target
skill with malicious skill, which causes a serious privacy concern. Additionally, an adversary can exploit the acquired personal information to
attack the user in the future.
Faking termination is a VMA where malicious skill fake skill termination to eavesdrop a user. Users may rely on skill’s response to
determine skill termination. For instance, users infer skill termination
if the skill prompts “goodbye” or remains silent after execution. An instance of faking termination is shown in Fig. 3. A list of users’ perceived
indicator of end of conversation is summarized in Table 2. Malicious
skills may create fake termination while keeping eavesdropping on
sensitive information of Amazon Echo users.
Mitigation. The mitigation to VMA employs user’s command and
skill’s response to establish an attack. There are two major components
of the mitigation mechanism [17], skill response checker and intention
classiﬁer.
Skill Response Checker (SRC) examines skill’s suspicious response to
establish an attack. SRC examines whether a skill mimics Alexa response

Indicator of end of conversation

Users

Echo says “Goodbye” or something similar
Echo does not talk
The LED light on Echo is oﬀ

23%
52%
25%

by utilizing a set of common response patterns in Alexa. An alarm is
triggered to notify Alexa of the event whenever a similar response is
detected.
User Intention Classiﬁer (UIC) examines a user’s voice commands to
ascertain if a user is wrongly attempting to switch to a new skill. UIC
utilizes the semantics and context of a user command to check the user’s
intent. An approach based on contextual information is used here. For
example, users use words semantically related to Alexa (such as “open
sleep sounds”) to switch contexts. Additionally, UIC compares user commands to system commands and current skills context to determine user
intent. However, recognizing a user’s intent is a challenging task. The
pattern in which users interact with their devices can vary. Thus, ﬁnding a typical user pattern can be exacting. Moreover, determining the
context of a command utilizes natural language processing. Even though
the technology is helpful, it is ever-evolving, which introduces new challenges.
3
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Fig. 4. Fingerprints being employed to detect audio match. Two audio with “bit error rate” less than 50% are likely to be from the same instance [34].

3.1.3. Network traﬃc analysis vulnerability
There are multiple works on network traﬃc analysis of Amazon Echo
in the literature. Apthorpe et al. [18] carried out a study in that direction
by setting up a laboratory smart home environment. The setup consists
of Raspberry Pi 3 Model B to record IoT devices incoming and outgoing
signal packets. The setup is utilized in a three-step strategy to identify
IoT devices residing in a home and infer user behaviors. Firstly, network
traﬃc is recorded and separated into streams. Secondly, an IoT device
most likely to be associated with the stream is identiﬁed. DNS queries
of each stream match the device. Thirdly, traﬃc rates of the stream are
monitored to reveal user behaviors.
In the experiment, Amazon Echo was asked a series of questions to
observe the device’s network traﬃc. The authors were able to identify
the instances of user-device interactions using network traﬃc data. The
knowledge of the user-device interaction time to an adversary may have
unwanted implications and privacy concerns.
IVA and IVA-enabled devices mostly communicate over a secure
channel using encrypted HTTPS [31]. However, such encryption cannot
protect speciﬁc communication patterns like payload sizes, data rates,
and source/destination. Many state-of-art machine learning techniques
can leverage such information to infer user behaviors such as duration
of user-device interaction, listening to music, and ordering products or
services. In addition to that, machine learning algorithms may be used
to predict user commands [32,33].

Fig. 5. Speech recognition error: El examen interpreted as Alexa triggers the
device.

3.1.5. Automatic Speech Recognition (ASR) errors
Though Amazon tried hard to address Alexa’s broadcast media vulnerability, Alexa is still vulnerable to various automatic speech recognition errors. Castell-Uroz et al. [21] experimented with an audio database
with a few interesting ﬁndings.
A Spanish language audio database (approx. 1700 ﬁles) was employed to surveil Echo’s reaction to distinct sounds. Database audio was
reproduced nearby Echo, where some words (e.g., “el examen”, “economia”) from the database triggered Alexa due to speech recognition error.
A situation where Alexa got triggered due to an ASR error is shown in
Fig. 5. After getting triggered, Alexa looked up commands on Amazon
server but was eventually discarded. The results designate that Amazon’s security mechanism discards this kind of false positive.
Mitigation. Due to the limitations of speech recognition technology,
ASR errors are unavoidable. However, attempts are made to minimize
errors and improve performance. For example, Swarup et al. [36] diminished ASR errors by enhancing existing baseline model architecture with
learned features. Similarly, Wang et al. [37] injected noise into errorfree ASR-generated text data to train the dialog model with augmented
data. The authors claimed to make VPA robust to ASR errors.

3.1.4. Broadcast media vulnerability
In January 2017, a six-year-old girl from Dallas accidentally ordered
a dollhouse while playing with Amazon Echo [3]. The device ordered a
dollhouse when the girl asked Echo, “Can you play dollhouse with me
and get me a dollhouse?”. Later, Echo devices in multiple households
were triggered when a morning show covered the event. The Amazon
Echos listening to the news, tried to order a dollhouse.
Mitigation. In response to such events, Amazon developed an onthe-cloud system to distinguish media audios. The system uses broadcast audio to teach Alexa about recorded instances of Alexa’s trigger
words and use this knowledge to detect recorded sounds in the future.
In addition, the system utilizes a technique called acoustic ﬁngerprinting, an eﬃcient mechanism that is robust to audio distortion and interference produced by television and other digital devices [34]. Usage of
ﬁngerprinting in such a process is shown in Fig. 4. However, some false
positive results were observed when testing several videos for the ﬁngerprint match [35]. In addition, some videos that do not contain a wake
word resulted in a ﬁngerprint match, which raises a question about the
technique’s robustness.

3.1.6. Lack of authorization mechanism
A user commands Echo by speaking out a trigger word. The trigger
word is “Alexa” by default, however, it can be conﬁgured to be one of
the “Amazon”, “Computer”, or “Echo” [38]. There is an absence of an
additional authentication layer to control the access to the device, which
is a serious vulnerability. Amazon Echo does not check if a command is
issued by an authorized user or someone else, making it vulnerable to
4
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attackers who manage to get access to the device. In addition to that,
Amazon Echo can be triggered by machine-generated voices due to the
lack of an authentication mechanism [22]. MP3 audio ﬁles generated via
an online resource have successfully accessed the device and executed
commands. MP3 audio from various devices such as Bluetooth speaker,
laptop, desktop, and mobile phone, is capable of issuing commands to
Alexa.
Mitigation. A layer of authentication can be implemented by adapting a biometrics-based authentication scheme in Amazon Echo. A camera module can be integrated to identify users and help enforce authentication schemes. Authorized users are veriﬁed by a face-recognition
system when they gaze into the device [39]. A face-recognition algorithm wakes up the camera and authenticates users enabling a secure
authorization mechanism. Once a user is authenticated, echo can listen
and execute user commands securely. The biometric-based authentication can be implemented in future models of Amazon Echo. However, it
is challenging to implement the authentication procedure in the current
and previous models in the user households due to the hardware nature
of mitigation.

Fig. 6. Attack ﬂow using XSS and CSRF token: ➀ User clicks on malicious link;
➁ Adversary gets user cookies; ➂ Adversary sends AJAX request with user cookies; ➃ Adversary gets skill list and CSRF token in response; and ➄ Adversary
adds/deletes skills using CSRF token and skill id.

3.1.7. Bluetooth associated vulnerability
IoT devices, including Amazon Echo, can be vulnerable to Bluetoothassociated vulnerability, which may compromise the device and user
data. Additionally, Bluetooth-enabled devices are vulnerable to “BlueBorne” attack vector that endangers the integrity of digital devices [20].
BlueBorne attack vector has eight zero-day vulnerabilities critical to IoT
device security. Speciﬁcally, there are two vulnerabilities of Amazon
Echo:
•
•

•
•
•
•
•

Linux kernel: Remote code execution vulnerability
SDP server: Information leak vulnerability

Mitigation. The ﬁndings of the study illustrating the vulnerabilities
were shared with Amazon. Amazon responded to it by ﬁxing issues and
pushing updates. No manual update is required from Echo users to mitigate the vulnerability.

BlueBorne permits attackers to compromise a device even when
Bluetooth is not in discoverable mode. For Amazon Echo, there is an
absence of a mechanism to turn Bluetooth oﬀ given the device’s limited
user interface, making it vulnerable to BlueBorne attack. Additionally,
Echo devices constantly scan for Bluetooth communications increasing
the risk of attack.
Mitigation. Armis Labs apprised Amazon regarding BlueBorne attack vector-associated risks. Amazon issued an update in response to
security ﬁxes. In addition, Amazon Echo users (version>v591448720)
have been automatically updated with the security patch.

3.1.9. Device pairing protocol vulnerability
Studies have found network vulnerability associated with pairing
clients with Amazon Echo. Janak et al. [19] found an issue with the outof-the-box experience (OOBE) protocol. Amazon Echo uses the OOBE
protocol to provide a device’s network credentials and establish the device with an Amazon account. One of the certiﬁcates, i.e., X.509, used in
the pairing process is self-signed, which makes the method vulnerable
to Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacks. Thus, an adversary detecting the
pairing exchange can acquire a link code and compromise the system.
The authors found that it is possible to link a previously de-registered
device to another amazon account. The vulnerability can be mitigated
by initially associating the new Amazon Echo with an Amazon account
used during device purchase.
The authors found another device pairing protocol vulnerability associated with Amazon web application. There exists a vulnerability in
web application pairing clients of Amazon Echo. The web application is
initially rendered via HTTPs, which is secured during the device pairing process. However, after a user logs in, the application rendered uses
HTTP to download the JavaScript pairing client. Since the mechanism
uses HTTP, it leaves the application vulnerable to attackers. The attackers can exploit the vulnerability to carry out code injection attacks which
can cause severe consequences.

3.1.8. Cross-Site scripting vulnerability
Cross-Site Scripting is an injection attack where malicious scripts are
injected into harmless websites. Alexa can be vulnerable to Cross-Site
Scripting (XSS), according to a study in August 2020 [23]. A CrossOrigin Resource Sharing (CORS) token can be extracted using XSS that
is exploited to perform actions using the victim’s identity. The attack
shown in Fig. 6 is carried out as follows:
•

•

•

•

•

Access user’s Alexa voice history.
Install skills to user’s Alexa without user’s knowledge.
View the list of User’s Alexa skills.
Remove a user’s skill without user’s knowledge.
Access user’s personal information that includes bank details, personal details, addresses, phone numbers, and etc.

The user receives a malicious link with code-injection capability that
redirects the user to amazon. User clicks on the malicious link.
An AJAX request using the user’s cookies is sent to access the list of
user’s installed skills on his/her Alexa account. The CSRF (Cross-Site
Request Forgery) token is retrieved as a part of the response.
CSRF token is misused to remove a skill from the user’s list of installed skills.
Attacker now installs a skill whose invocation phrase is identical to
the deleted skill.
Malicious skill is triggered when the user uses invocation phrase.

3.1.10. Cloud vulnerabilities
Cloud is an integral part of VPAs like Alexa, and provides both scalable computing service and virtually unlimited storage. Amazon stores
gigabytes of Alexa voice recording data every hour in its cloud storage.
Though VPA’s cloud reliance has multiple beneﬁts, it also introduces a
unique attack avenue for an adversary. The storage of a large amount of
information at a single point poses security concerns. Alexa may store
personal or sensitive information in the cloud. An attacker can exploit
such information if the data storage is compromised.

An adversary can exploit certain vulnerabilities in Alexa subdomains to carry out attacks targeting Alexa users. Adversary takes advantage of these vulnerabilities to carry out multiple actions in multiple
stages to attack targeted users. The attack initiates when the user clicks
on a malicious link. An attacker can carry out the following attacks [40]:
5
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Fig. 7. Demonstration of modulated tone traversing the signal pathway of a audio device in terms of FFT [5].
•

Amazon utilizes user data to train Alexa’s speech recognition and
natural language understanding algorithm [24]. The data is fed into the
algorithm to better understand user commands and take appropriate action. The algorithm learns from past data to make better responses in the
future. With the availability of a large amount of data, the algorithm can
train extensively, and Alexa can better interact with users. Despite the
advantages obtained from the procedure, Amazon can infer information
on user lifestyles such as daily routine, user preferences, etc. Moreover,
the information can be exploited to harm user if someone with an evil
intention gets access to the data.
Besides speech recognition and natural language understanding algorithm, Amazon also employs people to provide human feedback to
train the algorithms [25]. The team is responsible for listening to users
interacting with their devices and assisting in training software algorithms. The team listens to voice recordings captured at users’ homes,
transcribing and annotating them before sending feedback to the system. The process assists Amazon in training speech recognition and natural language understanding so that Alexa can better comprehend and
respond to human requests. In its marketing policy, Amazon does not
explicitly mention human listening being involved even though they say
that users’ requests are used to train their speech recognition and natural
language understanding systems.

These vulnerabilities can be exploited and allow the attacker to boot
into the underlying Linux environment from an SD card [27]. Furthermore, an attacker can boot into the device’s ﬁrmware and install a persistent backdoor that allows remote root shell access to the device. After
the root access is obtained, the attacker can install malware, steal authentication tokens, and wiretap the device remotely. Rooting Amazon
Echo requires physical access to the device, which may not be a concern
for a device in a secure location such as a personal household. However,
adapting Amazon Echo to places such as hotel rooms provides an avenue
for attacking [11].
3.3. System vulnerabilities
3.3.1. Always listening mechanism
Studies have shown that Amazon Echo starts recording and transmitting audio only after it gets triggered with a wake word [42]. Till then, it
stays in a dormant state of buﬀering and re-recording until a wake word
is detected. Ford and Palmer [28] carried out an experiment in that direction where they analyzed Echo Dots’ network traﬃc over 21 days in
a private household. Nobody in the household interacted with the devices on purpose utilizing a wake word during this period. Analyzing the
logged audio reveals that 70% of logged response cards were Television
sounds and 30% were human voices. This demonstrates that Amazon
Echo records private conversations without utilizing a wake word. This
can be a signiﬁcant privacy concern where personal or sensitive audio
is leaked accidentally or by an attacker.
Mitigation. The vulnerability can be mitigated by turning the device mic oﬀ with a physical mechanism while speaking out private information. Alexa does not stream audio to Amazon AVS cloud while
the device mic is turned oﬀ [28]. Echo light turns red when microphone is turned oﬀ as shown in Fig. 8. However, many users

3.2. Hardware vulnerabilities
3.2.1. Dolphin attack
Dolphin attack is an inaudible attack that exploits the ultrasound
channel and underlying hardware vulnerability to inject inaudible voice
commands at VPAs. The attack uses modulated audio commands on ultrasound carriers (frequency >20 kHz), making the command inaudible
to the human ear [5]. The modulated command is demodulated and
interpreted at voice capture hardware and speech recognition system,
respectively, at VPA. The modulated audio signal can be successfully
demodulated by leveraging the non-linearity of microphone circuits.
Modulated signal traversing an audio capture device is illustrated in
Fig. 7. The attack exploits Micro Electro Mechanical Systems (MEMS)
microphones that accept inaudible ultrasound signals as legitimate commands. Since the attack employs synthesized ultrasound signals, an attacker requires proximity to the target device. For example, Amazon
Echo can pick up and execute inaudible audio commands from a distance of 165 cm. The attack range was further increased to 25ft by exploiting the non-linearity of the Echo’s microphone [41].
Mitigation. Dolphin attacks can be abused to carry out unsolicited
actions on Amazon Echo. Therefore, defense strategies should be employed to address the unwanted attacks. Hardware-based defense strategies such as microphone enhancement can be an approach in that direction. Since the current MEMS microphones can sense high frequency
(>20 kHz) signals, they can be enhanced to suppress such signals. Similarly, there have been defense attempts utilizing the non-linearity traces,
which cannot be erased during the signal modulation [41].
3.2.2. Booting into device ﬁrmware
Amazon Echo can be exploited physically, allowing an adversary to
gain root shell access to the underlying Linux OS. Amazon Echo has two
underlying vulnerabilities. [26]:
•

Hardware conﬁguration setting that permits booting device via an
external Secure Digital (SD) card.

Fig. 8. User turn device mic oﬀ while revealing conﬁdential information. Echo’s
LED light turns red while mic is oﬀ.

Exposed debug pads at its base.
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Fig. 9. Design of VSButton [22]. VSButton utilizes Channel State Information (CSI) to detect human motion. Noises in CSI values are eliminated in CSI Processing
Module. CSI patterns of movement is detected in Outlier Detection Module.

do not use the mic button despite being aware of the functionality.
Multiple users perceive the technique negates the device’s hands-free
accessibility [43].

3.3.2. Lack of physical presence detection mechanism
Amazon Echo does not require a user to be physically present near
the device to request a service. Due to the absence of a mechanism to
detect the physical presence, an Alexa-enabled device executes any command that it can hear, provided that the command is loud enough. Any
service request that reaches Amazon Echo at 60dB (or higher) sound
pressure level gets served by the device. It is a severe vulnerability that
can be exploited in multiple ways. For instance, an adversary can issue a command from the facade to access Amazon Echo inside a household. The adversary can then aggravate the attack by utilizing other
devices connected to the Echo. Alternatively, an adversary can control
Echo if he gets access to one of the speakers in proximity to the Echo
in the household. The attacker can abuse the speaker to play audio
containing wake words and commands to compromise Alexa-enabled
devices.
Mitigation. A user’s physical presence can be detected by the Virtual
Security Button (VSButton), which is an access control technique that
utilizes the physical presence of a user. The secure access mechanism allows access to Alexa only when VSButton is in a push state. The virtual
button is pushed whenever a human presence is detected nearby. The
access control mechanism utilizes a home WiFi network to detect user
movement. VSButton monitors the Channel State Information (CSI) of
home WiFi to detect human motion. A user can push VSButton simply by
waving his hand. The variation in CSI values within a room can be leveraged to detect human motion. Movements inside a room cause considerable variation in CSI values, while movement outside the room/house
causes only a tiny variation. The phenomenon is employed to determine
if movement is occurring inside the room.
The human movement detection by VSButton consists of two major
steps:
•
•

Fig. 10. REEVE attack ﬂow: Television receives recorded commands from
HackRF One and speaks out the commands to Alexa. Alexa triggers and executes the commands [29].

3.4. Vulnerabilities exploitation by attackers
3.4.1. Remote voice control (REEVE) attack
REEVE attack is a remote attack that exploits devices like radio, TV,
speaker, etc., to attack Amazon Echo and carry out unauthorized actions. TV speaker, radio speaker, or Bluetooth speaker controlled by an
attacker is exploited to attack Amazon Echo. An experiment investigated
a scenario where a TV speaker is used to control the Amazon Echo by
replacing the video content of the current TV channel with a video containing several Echo commands [29]. The brute force approach can
determine the current TV channel for the attack. Channel 48, i.e., HBO,
was used for the attack in the experiment. The Amazon Echo commands
recorded originally in mp4 format are later converted into the “Transport Stream” format that HackRF uses for ATSC (Advanced Television
Systems Committee) broadcast. Amazon Echo was placed at a distance
of six meters from the Television in the same room, while HackRF One
was kept at a distance of four meters from Amazon Echo outside the
room. The setup is illustrated in Fig. 10. After that, GNU radio software
was conﬁgured with a central frequency of 677 MHZ and a bandwidth
of 6 MHz to broadcast fake programs to replace HBO content. HackRF
One is used to transmit recorded programs to the TV. When the Television is turned on, it plays the fake recorded program containing several
Alexa commands executed when Echo hears them.

CSI processing phase;
Outlier detection phase.

In CSI Processing Phase, noises in CSI values are eliminated. The output is then utilized in Outlier Detection Phase to detect CSI patterns of
movements inside the room. A real-time hyper-ellipsoidal outlier detection mechanism is employed in the later phase to detect human movement. The components of VSButton are shown in Fig. 9.
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can be concerning during critical situations. An attacker can prolong the
DoS attack to make Echo nonfunctional for a longer duration which can
be more concerning. Finally, if an attacker has proper knowledge and
tools, he can utilize freely available resources within Kali Linux to carry
out the attack.
4. Conclusion
Alexa has changed the way users interact with personal assistance devices in a revolutionized way. With the popularity of the Amazon Echo
family of devices, users can carry out tasks like making phone calls, online shopping, and controlling the smart home with voice commands.
Due to the widespread use of Echo devices, it is imperative to ensure
proper security and privacy measures to avoid an unwanted scenario
in the future. Few vulnerabilities of Echo devices discovered during the
literature review are discussed in this paper. The vulnerabilities are classiﬁed as software, hardware, or system vulnerability and speciﬁc adversary attacks. Mitigation of the vulnerabilities is also discussed simultaneously. We observed that though few vulnerabilities are mitigated,
many others remain unresolved.
The primary theme of this research was to investigate and summarize
the existing vulnerabilities of Amazon Echo. For future work, we plan
to narrow down to a speciﬁc vulnerability for a detailed study. Furthermore, we intend to get insights into the network behaviors of Amazon
Echo by analyzing the device’s network traﬃc data. Finally, detailed research on network behavior using machine learning models may give
an outlook on new vulnerabilities or conﬁrm existing ﬁndings, which
would be an exciting line of future work.

Fig. 11. Network diagram for penetration testing [30].

Mitigation. REEVE attack can be defended by addressing two root
causes of the attack [29]:
•
•

Lack of user authentication;
Lack of additional security layer for sensitive services.

Due to the absence of user authentication for accessing Echo, Alexa
can be triggered by unauthorized users and electronic devices. Twofactor authentication can be implemented to mitigate the issue by verifying the authorized user’s voice pattern. Moreover, Alexa can ask users
questions on the ﬂy, where the user must answer questions to continue
accessing the device. These approaches verify the physical presence and
user identity while performing security-sensitive operations. In addition
to that, Echo can enforce an authorization policy where only authorized
users can perform security-critical activities such as opening the front
door of the house.
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3.4.2. Denial-of-Service attack
Overstreet et al. [30] carried out penetration testing to test the vulnerability of Amazon Echo against Denial of Service (DoS) attack. Kali
Linux operating system was used for carrying out the attack and network monitoring. One instance of Kali Linux was set up in Samsung
900X and the other in Virtual Box hypervisor in a macOS system to
carry out network monitoring and DoS attack, respectively. After that,
an open and unsecured network was created using ASUS WL-500W wireless router. The ﬁrmware of the router was ﬂashed and OpenWRT was
installed. OpenWRT is a Linux-based OS for the network device. The
network setup is illustrated in Fig. 11.
A network scan was carried out after the setup. Firstly, nmap scan
was run to collect the MAC and IP addresses of devices connected to
the network. Another nmap scan was run to ﬁnd information about TCP
ports on the devices via the SPARTA tool in Kali Linux. Then Samsung’s
network interface card was changed from managed to monitor mode
to trace the Amazon Echo’s activity on the test network. Airodump-ng
command was run to dump network traﬃc to the speciﬁed directory in
pcap format. The capture ﬁle was imported into Wireshark to analyze
packets and infer the activities occurring over the network. After the
network scan was complete, a DoS attack was carried out on Amazon
Echo. Metasploit was used to launching a syn-ﬂood attack to crash Amazon Echo. Data was captured before and during the attack to observe
network traﬃc which was analyzed later using Wireshark. Before the
attack, network traﬃc was regular, but packets were dropped on the
network during the attack. Furthermore, the syn-ﬂood attack crashed
Amazon Echo, making the Echo’s LED indicator (located at the top of
the device) turn red instead of the standard blue color. The device’s
functionality returned to normal after the attack concluded.
There are signiﬁcant consequences of the DoS attack on Amazon
Echo. First, a user is not able to access information when required, which
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